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ENDING THE SILENCE: 
THAI H-2A WORKERS, RECRUITMENT FEES,  
AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
Andrea L. Schmitt† 
Abstract:  Increasing numbers of Thai workers are coming to the United States 
using “H-2A” temporary agricultural worker visas.  Compared with their Latin American 
counterparts, Thai H-2A workers are more vulnerable to poor working conditions and 
other abusive employment practices for two reasons.  First, the workers often pay large 
recruitment fees to labor recruiters in Thailand, and they therefore arrive with a much 
weightier debt burden. This debt, combined with conditions inherent in the H-2A system, 
puts intense pressure on workers to remain silent.  Second, Thai workers are more 
culturally and linguistically isolated in rural U.S. communities than their Latin American 
counterparts.  This comment argues that bringing claims under the minimum wage 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) can be an effective litigation 
strategy to protect Thai H-2A workers who have a large recruitment-fee debt burden.  
Under the doctrines of apparent authority agency and inherent agency, the workers’ 
employers may be responsible for the fees that recruiters charge.  These fees are for the 
primary benefit of the growers and cannot be counted as wages under the FLSA. 
Consequently, growers must reimburse workers for recruitment fees during their first 
week of employment in order to avoid minimum wage violations under the FLSA.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wallapa McDonald is the owner of one of the three Thai restaurants in 
Yakima, Washington.  Yakima, a city of 79,000,1 is located in the rural 
agricultural region of central Washington State, the northwestern-most state 
of the United States.  McDonald’s usual clientele is a representative 
sampling of the community—mostly White, some Hispanic,2 and the 
occasional European or Asian visitor.3  McDonald, who is Thai, estimates 
that half a dozen Thai speakers live in Yakima.4  Because she rarely 
encounters other Thai people in Yakima, she was understandably astounded5 
when a ragged group of Thai farmers wandered into her restaurant one day 
in the summer of 2004.6  The men were elated to have found someone who 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professors Kristen Stilt and Joel Ngugi for their invaluable support 
and guidance in the writing of this comment.  
1
 U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: Yakima city, Washington,  http://factfinder.census.gov/home/ 
saff/main.html?_lang=en (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Yakima Census]. 
2
 Id. (Yakima is thirty-seven percent Hispanic).  
3
 Questions Posed to Wallapa McDonald (Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter McDonald Questions] (on file 
with The Pacific Rim Law  & Policy Journal).  
4
 Id.  
5
 Interview with Wallapa McDonald, Owner, Siam House Restaurant, by telephone (Feb. 23, 2006). 
6
 Letter from Wallapa McDonald, Owner, Siam House Restaurant 1 (Jan. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
McDonald Letter] (on file with The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
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understood their language, and they told McDonald their story.7  They had 
been recruited in Thailand to work in the apple orchards around Yakima8 and 
had come to the United States on “H-2A” temporary agricultural worker 
visas.9  
Life in Yakima had been difficult for the Thai men.  They were not 
earning nearly as much as they had been promised by the recruiters in 
Thailand, and they feared they would not be able to pay back the enormous 
loans that they had taken out to pay labor recruiters in Thailand.10  Their 
housing was cramped, and it lacked kitchen facilities.11  The workers 
suspected that their employers were not paying them correctly, but they had 
no way to verify this because none of them could speak English or read the 
Roman alphabet.12  Though not a legal expert herself, McDonald was certain 
the workers’ living conditions did not meet state standards, and she called 
Washington State authorities to report the violations.13  She also helped the 
men as best she could, taking them food when their pay was late and 
shuttling them the thirty blocks to their hotel from her store, so they would 
not have to carry large bags of rice on their shoulders.14   
The H-2A program, through which the Thai workers came to Yakima, 
is the United States’ agricultural “guest worker” program.15  Established in 
its current form through the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act,16 
the program allows American agricultural employers to bring foreign 
workers to the United States on non-immigrant visas for limited periods of 
time.17  Ostensibly, H-2A visas are only granted in times when there are 
genuine shortages of domestic labor.18  Growers who use the H-2A program 
                                           
7
 Leah Beth Ward, Thai Farm Workers Seek Equity in Strange Land, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC, 
Oct. 9, 2005. 
8
 Id.  
9
 Id.  The visas are known as “H-2A” visas after their designation in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.  8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2000). 
10
 McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 1. 
11
 Id. at 1; Ward, supra, note 7. 
12
 McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 2. 
13
 Ward, supra note 7. 
14
 McDonald Letter, supra note 6 at 1. 
15
 Bruce Goldstein, The Basics About Guest Worker Programs, http://www.fwjustice.org/ 
GWbasics.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006). 
16
 Kimi Jackson, Comment, Farmworkers, Nonimmigration Policy, Involuntary Servitude, and a 
Look at the Sheepherding Industry, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1271, 1278 (2000); see also 8 U.S.C.S. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2000). 
17
 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(C) (2006). 
18
 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(b)(1)(A) (2005). 
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usually make connections with foreign workers by using farm labor 
contractors, who recruit the workers in their home countries.19 
Despite a host of protections and benefits provided by the H-2A 
program, experience has shown H-2A workers are prone to abuse by their 
employers.20  Thai H-2A workers are even more vulnerable than most other 
H-2A workers, who are predominantly Latin American. This is in part 
because the Thais are more linguistically and culturally isolated from the 
rural American communities where they come to work.21  More importantly, 
Thai workers pay substantial recruitment fees in Thailand to secure their H-
2A jobs and usually arrive in the United States with staggering debt.22  The 
magnitude of their debt and the harshness of the loan terms combine with 
conditions engendered by the H-2A program to render workers practically 
unable to complain about abusive conditions and wage and hour violations.  
These burdens also make it virtually impossible for the workers to leave 
their jobs.  The workers effectively find themselves in debt bondage—they 
are unlikely to complain and apt to remain on the job despite poor 
conditions.23  Protecting Thai workers from onerous recruitment fee debt 
would give the workers more leverage to demand safe and healthy housing 
and working environments.   
A U.S.-based solution to recruitment fee debt is vital to enabling Thai 
H-2A workers to protect themselves from abuse because the Thai 
government cannot or will not stop Thai recruiters from charging exorbitant 
fees.24  The minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act25 may provide much-needed protection to Thai workers from large 
recruitment fees.26 
This comment argues that claims under the minimum wage provisions 
of the FLSA are a viable litigation strategy for protecting Thai H-2A workers 
                                           
19
 See PHILIP L. MARTIN AND J. EDWARD TAYLOR, MERCHANTS OF LABOR:  FARM LABOR 
CONTRACTORS AND IMMIGRATION REFORM 1 (The Urban Institute 1995); See Esther Schrader, Widening 
the Field of Workers, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 26, 1999 at A1 (A single farm labor contractor in North 
Carolina brought half of the H-2A workers to the U.S. in 1999).  The growers in Washington who recruited 
Thai workers did so by first hiring Global Horizons, a Los Angeles based farm labor contractor.  See 
Settlement Agreement: Global Horizons, Inc./Department of Labor and Industries/Employment Security 
Department 1 (September 22, 2005) [hereinafter Global Settlement] (on file with The Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal).   
20
 See infra Part II.A. 
21
 See infra Part II.D. 
22
 See infra Part II.D. 
23
 See Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers 
from Enforcing their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 595-596 (2001). 
24
 See infra Part III.A. 
25
 The Fair Labor Standards Act is the primary U.S. federal statute governing wages and hours of 
work.  See generally 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
26
 See infra Part III.D. 
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from debilitating recruitment-fee debt.  Part II discusses H-2A workers’ 
vulnerability to abuse and demonstrates that recruitment-fee debt burden 
makes Thai workers particularly susceptible to abuse and attractive to U.S. 
growers.  Part III presents a case that growers can be held accountable under 
the common law of agency for recruitment fees.  It demonstrates that if 
growers are accountable for the fees, the growers violate the FLSA when 
they do not reimburse the recruitment fees, at least in part, during the 
workers’ first week on the job.   
II. THAI H-2A WORKERS ARE UNIQUELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ABUSIVE 
CONDITIONS THAT ARE COMMON IN THE PROGRAM 
H-2A agricultural guest workers are susceptible to abuses, such as 
deficient housing, poor working conditions, and wage and hour violations, 
despite the protections provided for them in the H-2A regulations.  It is in 
growers’ financial interest to hire workers whose economic vulnerability 
makes them responsive to coercive tactics like “blacklisting.”27  Thai 
workers are inherently more vulnerable to abuse than most other H-2A 
workers in part because they are more linguistically and culturally isolated 
from the communities in which they work.  They are also uniquely unlikely 
to complain about their conditions because Thai workers often come to the 
U.S. with weighty debt from recruitment fees they paid at home.28 
A. H-2A Workers Often Experience Abuse 
The realities of H-2A workers’ conditions often do not coincide with 
H-2A regulations.  On paper, the regulations provide an impressive list of 
benefits to H-2A workers, including housing, round-trip transportation from 
their homes to the job site, a rate of pay that is almost always higher than the 
federal minimum wage, and a guarantee that they will have work during at 
least three-fourths of the contract period.29  In practice, however, abuses of 
H-2A workers are commonplace.  Farm worker advocates and reporters have 
documented numerous instances of abuse of H-2A workers, including:  
                                           
27
  “Blacklisting” is a tactic in which growers place workers’ names on a “no return” list of workers 
who are not allowed to work for that grower again.  In North Carolina, for example, “[a]ny one grower in 
the [North Carolina Growers’ Association] determines whether an individual worker can come back to 
North Carolina and work for any of the almost one thousand growers in the [Association] the following 
year.”  Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights of H-2A Farmworkers, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. Y COM. REG. 521, 
533 (2002). 
28
 See Holley, supra note 23, at 595-596. 
29
 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.102(b)(1), (5), (6), (9) (2005). 
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denial of medical treatment,30 pesticide safety violations,31 wage and hour 
violations,32 substandard housing conditions,33 and provision of dangerous 
transportation.34  
The Washington Thai workers’ experience was no exception.  In the 
summer of 2004, most of the workers lived in overcrowded motel rooms.35  
They were deprived of proper kitchen facilities, and “cooked on the floor 
with hot burners plugged onto overloaded circuits and washed dishes in the 
bathtub.”36  These conditions violated Washington State Department of 
Health regulations.37   
The workers suffered wage and hour violations as well.  Their farm 
labor contractor (“FLC”) illegally withheld state taxes that do not exist and 
federal taxes from which the workers were exempt.38  The workers also 
alleged that money the FLC deducted to be sent to their families in Thailand 
never arrived.39  The terms and conditions of employment remained an 
enigma to the workers, leaving them unable to evaluate whether the 
contractor and the grower breached their employment contracts.40  Some 
workers signed one contract in Thai at home and another contract—which 
they could not read because it was in English—when they arrived.41  
Furthermore, the FLC never provided a worker agreement in Thai to some of 
its workers.42  In at least one instance, even when the farm labor contractor 
did provide the contract in Thai, the contract verbiage was difficult for the 
worker to understand.43   
                                           
30
 H. Michael Semler, The H-2 Program: Aliens in the Orchard: The Admission of Foreign Contract 
Laborers for Temporary Work in U.S. Agriculture, 1 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 209 (1983); Leah Beth 
Ward, Desperate Harvest, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 31, 1999, at 1A [hereinafter Desperate Harvest].   
31
 Hall, supra note 27, at 534. 
32
 Michael Blanding, The Invisible Harvest, BOSTON MAG., Oct. 2002 available at 
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/the_invisible_harvest/; Barry Yeoman, Silence in the Fields, 
Mother Jones, Jan./Feb. 2001 available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2001/01/farm.html. 
33
 Desperate Harvest, supra note 30, at 1A. 
34
 Holley, supra note 23, at 618.   
35
 Lornet Turnbull, New Guest Worker Contracts in Doubt,  SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002 at A18; 
McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 2; Ward, supra note 7. 
36
 Ward, supra note 7.  
37
 Wash. Admin. Code 296-307-16125 (2005) (capacity of housing); Wash. Admin. Code 296-307-
16165 (2005) (kitchen facilities).  For H-2A housing, local housing regulations apply, and if there are none, 
state regulations apply.  20 C.F.R § 655.102(b)(1)(iii) (2005). 
38
 Stipulations of the Parties, In Re: Global Horizons, Inc., No. 2005-LI-0056 at 2-3 (Washington 
Office of Administrative Hearings, Sept. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Global Horizons Stipulations]; see Global 
Settlement, supra note 19, at Attachment A.  
39
 Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18. 
40
 Ward, supra, note 7. 
41
 Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18. 
42
 Global Horizons Stipulations, supra note 38, at 2 
43
 Ward, supra note 7.   
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Like other H-2A workers, the Washington Thai workers were reluctant 
to protest.  The growers deterred them from complaining by threatening to 
blacklist them.44  The workers also alleged that the growers punished them 
for questioning their conditions by not allowing them to work,45 thereby 
denying them the chance to earn money.  
B. Growers Have Incentives to Seek Workers Who Are Economically 
Vulnerable and Susceptible to Coercive Tactics 
H-2A workers are attractive to growers, who are constantly looking 
for new, more vulnerable populations with which to replenish their labor 
forces.46  For U.S. growers of labor-intensive crops, a key to keeping 
production costs low is finding workers who will work for low wages and in 
poor conditions.47  Historically, growers and the government have thwarted 
union organizers by ensuring that there is always a ready supply of new 
migrant workers who are willing to accept less compensation and fewer 
benefits than their better-established peers and who are unlikely to 
organize.48  In the past, a porous border with Mexico allowed a steady 
stream of new migrants to enter the U.S.49  However, due to stricter border 
enforcement or other changing social factors, growers are now finding fewer 
Mexican workers who are willing to work in the conditions they offer.50  In 
the absence of a steady flow of vulnerable and difficult-to-unionize new 
migrants, H-2A workers are the next best thing for growers.  H-2A workers 
are in the country for finite periods of time51 and have fixed contract terms 
and conditions,52 making them unlikely candidates for successful collective 
bargaining.  Additionally, growers can easily coerce the workers out of 
talking to union representatives.53  
                                           
44
 Id. (“…they say they fear anything they say would be used against them and prevent them from 
coming back next season.”). 
45
 Id.  
46
 See Fred Krissman, Agribusiness Strategies to Divide the Workforce by Class, Ethnicity, and 
Legal Status, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 216, 234 (Paul Wong, Ed., 1999). 
47
 See Id.; Martin and Taylor, supra note 19, at 1. 
48
 See Krissman, supra note 46, at 225, 232, 239-239; Martin and Taylor, supra note 19, at 6. 
49
 See generally Krissman, supra note 46. 
50
 See Farm Labor Shortages, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Jan. 7, 2006, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/ 
rmn/more.php?id=1087_0_4_0 (last visited Sept. 19, 2006); National Public Radio, Labor Shortage 
Threatens Winter Lettuce Harvest, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Dec 29, 2005 available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5074844. 
51
 8 C.F.R § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(C) (2006). 
52
 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14) (2005).   
53
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 159 (2004). 
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Employers often use threats of deportation and blacklisting as tools to 
maximize workers’ acquiescence in poor conditions.54  H-2A workers may 
not work for any employer other than the employers who originally sought 
their visas.55  Thus, workers who are victims of abuse cannot leave their 
employers without immediately invalidating their visas.56 Employers hold 
the power to have the workers deported, and the workers have little leverage 
in negotiations with the employers.57  Even when employers do not 
immediately fire workers for complaining, they often blacklist the workers,58 
preventing them from returning the next season.59 
The threat of deportation or blacklisting can be more intense for H-2A 
workers who go into debt in order to obtain H-2A jobs in the first place.60  
An illustrative example of debt pressure can be found in Mexican H-2A 
workers, who are often forced to borrow money to pay transportation costs 
to the United States61 and obliged to pay recruitment fees of $300 to $1000 
at home for the privilege of obtaining a visa.62  Empirically, the added 
pressure of debt makes the workers even less likely to complain when 
conditions are poor.63 
Growers have an interest in employing H-2A workers who have 
disincentives to leave their jobs, even when conditions are poor.64  The 
workers who are most likely to stay despite abuses are those who are the 
most vulnerable.  As the President’s Commission on Migratory Labor noted 
                                           
54
 Ward, supra note 7 (“ ‘The system depends on maintaining the fear of being fired or deported and 
not being called back next season,’ said Bruce Goldstein, executive director of the Farmworker Justice 
Fund…”). 
55
 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(B) (2006). 
56
 Holley, supra note 23, at 595. 
57
 Semler, supra note 30, at 209 (“…the employer controls the worker’s very right to remain in this 
country.”). 
58
 Holley, supra note 23, at 595. 
59
 Blacklisting is an extremely common practice among H-2A employers.  See HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 53, at 159; Hall, supra note 27, at 533;  Desperate Harvest, supra note 30 at 1A; 
Yeoman, supra note 32, at para. 27.  To end up on a blacklist, a worker need not cause much trouble; 
workers fear blacklisting for insisting that employers comply with state requirements as simple as 
providing cups for drinking water in the fields. Desperate Harvest, supra note 30, at 1A.    
60
 Holley, supra note 23, at 595-596.   
61
 See Schrader, supra note 19,, at A1; Hall, supra note 27, at 534.  H-2A regulations require 
employers to pay the cost of transportation for workers from their permanent homes, but the employers do 
not have to pay the workers until they have completed 50 percent of the contract period.  20 C.F.R. § 
655.102(b)(5)(i) (2005).  The Eleventh Circuit held in Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms that, under the 
FLSA, growers were required to reimburse at least some of these transportation costs during the first week 
of work to avoid minimum wage violations. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir 
2002).    
62
 Schrader, supra note 19, at A1; Desperate Harvest, supra note 30, at 1A; Jen McCaffery, 
Virginia’s Migrants Easily Exploited, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at A1. 
63
 See Holley, supra note 23, at 596; Hall, supra note 27, at 534. 
64
 Comm’n on Agricultural Workers, Report 26 (1992). 
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in 1951, “Migrants are children of misfortune. . . .  We depend on misfortune 
to build up our force of migratory workers and when the supply is low 
because there is not enough misfortune at home, we rely on misfortune 
abroad to replenish the supply.”65  Likewise, when there is not enough 
misfortune in the Latin American farm worker population to keep them 
silenced and on the job, U.S. growers turn to more vulnerable populations, 
like Thai workers. 
C. Thai H-2A Workers Are Attractive to Growers Because They Are 
Linguistically and Culturally Isolated  
H-2A workers from Thailand are especially good “labor replacement” 
because they are more susceptible to abuse than their Latin American H-2A 
counterparts.  Thai workers are much more isolated than Latina and Latino 
workers who may have many linguistic and cultural brethren in the 
communities where they work.66  In Yakima, a rural community with 
approximately half a dozen Thai speaking residents,67 the workers had no 
means by which to complain about their housing conditions and their 
suspicions about underpayment of wages. The Washington Thai workers did 
not speak English.68  This is likely typical of Thai H-2A workers, as a 
majority of the Thai citizens who seek employment abroad are from the 
rural, poor69 northeastern part of the country,70 and most of these workers 
have no more than a fourth-grade education.71   It was only by chance that 
                                           
65
 President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture 3 (1951). 
66
 Latina/o and Spanish-speaking migrant workers in central Washington find an established 
Spanish-speaking community and  have numerous social and legal services resources available to them.  
See Yakima Census, supra note 1 (thirty-seven percent of Yakima’s population is Hispanic); Washington 
Law Help, http://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/WA/index.cfm/language/39/state/WA (last visited Sept. 19, 
2006) (showing the wide variety of legal information available in Spanish to Washington residents); 
Consejo, Counseling and Referral Services for the Latino Community, http://www.consejo-
wa.org/aboutus1.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) (listing social services in areas from drug abuse to 
domestic violence for Washington Latinos).  In contrast, Thai speakers struggle to make community 
connections. See McDonald Questions, supra, note 3. 
67
 McDonald Questions, supra note 3. 
68
 Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18. 
69
 Kitisak Sinthuvanich and Chitti Chuenyong, Rural Poverty Alleviation in Thailand 2 (United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Meeting Paper No. 13, 1997) available 
at http://www.unescap.org/rural/doc/beijing_march97/thailand.PDF. 
70
 In 2004, of a total of 121,200 male Thai workers abroad, 80,861 of them were from the 
northeastern part of Thailand.  Thailand Overseas Employment Administration, Statistics of Thai Workers 
by Domicile: Year: 2004 (2004) available at http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/news/index.html.  Statistics 
from 1998-2003 show similar percentages of workers coming from the northeast.  See Thailand Overseas 
Employment Administration, Statistics of Thai Workers by Domicile: Year: 1998-2002 (2002), available at 
http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/news/index.html.    
71
 In 2004, of a total of 121,200 Thai men working abroad, 71,329 had completed the fourth grade or 
a less advanced education.  See Thailand Overseas Employment Administration, Statistics of Thai Workers 
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they stumbled across the Siam House restaurant and McDonald, its Thai-
speaking owner.72  Before meeting McDonald, the workers were utterly 
unable to communicate with anyone in the community and were “dependent 
in every practical sense” on the farm labor contractor who brought them to 
the country.73  Thai workers are hampered by isolation from American rural 
communities to a far greater extent than most other H-2A workers. 
Thai workers’ reduced ability to complain seems to have incentivized 
growers to bring them to the United States.  Despite higher costs associated 
with recruiting and transporting Southeast Asian workers, farm labor 
contractors have brought increasing numbers of Asian workers using the H-
2A program in recent years.74  This trend represents a shift away from the 
historic use of H-2A visas almost exclusively for Latin American and 
Caribbean workers.75  In the summer of 2004, a Los Angeles-based labor 
recruiter brought approximately 170 Thai workers to labor in the apple 
orchards that surround Yakima, Washington.76  The same company intended 
to bring 550 workers in subsequent years.77   
D. Thai H-2A Workers Are More Vulnerable to Abuse than Other H-2A 
Workers 
Thai workers incur much larger recruitment-fee debt burdens than 
their Latin American counterparts, rendering the Thais less able to protect 
themselves from abuse.  The Washington Thai workers paid as much as 
$8000 to $20,000 in fees to recruiters in Thailand in order to secure their 
                                                                                                                              
by Education Levels: Year: 2004 (2004), http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/news/index.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2006).    
72
 Ward, supra note 7. 
73
 Ward, supra note 7;  McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 2. 
74
 See H-2A, H-2B, Braceros, Rural Migration News, July 20, 2005, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/ 
rmn/more.php?id=779_0_4_0 (last visited November 4, 2006) (documenting groups of Thai H-2A workers 
in California, Arizona, and Hawaii); Florida, Migrants, Rural Migration News, July 15, 2003, 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=734_0_3_0 (last visited November 4, 2006) (referring to 
efforts to supply Thai H-2A workers to Florida farms); Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory 
Relief, Ingthalangsy v. New Tree Personnel Services, Inc. (E.D.N.C. October 2003) at 5 [hereinafter New 
Tree Complaint] (on file with The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal) (referring to a small group of Lao H-
2A workers in North Carolina); Carrie Kahn, Western Farmers Look for More Immigrant Workers, 
MORNING EDITION, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, May 12, 2006, available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5400389  (referencing major farm labor contractor’s goal of bringing 
5,000 Thai workers to twenty-seven states in 2007).   
75
 See Holley, supra note 23, at 619 (as of 2001, ninety percent of H-2A workers were from 
Mexico); Jackson, supra note 16, at 1281.  
76
 H-2A, H-2B, SSN, Rural Migration News, April 14, 2005, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/ 
more.php?id=985_0_4_0 (last visited November 4, 2006) [hereinafter Rural Migration News SSN]. 
77
 Global Horizons Stipulations, supra note 38, at 5. 
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places as H-2A workers78—staggering amounts considering that the average 
yearly salary in Thailand is just over $2000.79   
Numerous accounts demonstrate that it is standard practice in 
Thailand for recruiters to charge workers large fees for work abroad.80  Most 
Thais who work abroad cannot pay the recruitment fees by themselves and 
are forced to take out loans with their homes or land as collateral.81  
Usurious interest rates of as much as sixty percent per year are not out of the 
ordinary for these loans,82 which often come from “money lenders” rather 
than from banks.83  Some of the workers who do not own property for loan 
collateral “rent” land deeds from neighbors or relatives, putting them further 
in debt.84  Fear of not being able to repay recruitment fee loans seems to be a 
constant pressure on Thai workers.85  In fact, there are at least two widely 
reported instances of Thai workers who committed suicide because they 
were unable to repay their recruitment fee loans.86  An experienced farm 
worker advocate has noted that most Latin American H-2A workers who 
cannot tolerate abusive conditions “‘vote with their feet’ and leave silently 
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79
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Happened, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 31, 2002 (citing fees of THB 200,000 for jobs in Taiwan). 
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 Ward, supra note 7; Supang Chantavanich and Andreas Germershausen, Introduction: Research 
on Thai Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia, in THAI MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1996-1997 7 (Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 
2000) [hereinafter Thai Migrant Workers, Introduction].  A 1995 Thai Labour Ministry Survey showed that 
73.5% of workers leaving Thailand needed loans to do so.  Somchai Ratanakomut, Issues of International 
Migration in Thailand, in THAI MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1996-1997 131 
(Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 2000). 
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 Thai Migrant Workers, Introduction, supra note 81, at 7; Paul Handley, Innocents Abroad, FAR 
EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 1991 at 41;  See Phannee Chunjitkaruna, Pitfalls and Problems in the Search 
for a Better Life: Thai Migrant Workers in Japan, in THAI MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST 
ASIA: 1996-1997 263 (Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 2000) 
(interest of up to 20% per month from village moneylender for job in Japan). 
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 Chunjitkaruna, supra note 82, at 263; Handley, supra note 82, at 41.  
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 Ward, supra note 7. 
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 See Ward, supra note 7 (stating that workers sometimes sit idle, “…not getting paid, which is their 
worst fear as interest adds up on their loans back home.”). 
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 See Athittaya Wichitanurak, Overseas-job Fees Spur Man’s Suicide, THE NATION (THAILAND), 
May 3, 2002 (telling the story of a Thai worker in Taiwan who killed himself over a THB 150,000 loan); 
Chunjitkaruna, supra note 82, at 265 (recounting the story of a Thai man who killed himself due to the 
prospect of being unable to repay a THB 200,000 loan with punitive interest for a job in Japan). 
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rather than complain.”87  Thai workers, on the other hand, are bound to their 
jobs by the pressures of recruitment-fee debt. 
It is difficult for workers to secure overseas employment from 
Thailand without utilizing recruiters.  There are four methods that Thai 
workers may use to get jobs overseas:  1) registration with the Ministry of 
Labour, 2) contact through private labor recruitment agencies, 3) direct 
recruitment by employers, and 4) self-arrangement of employment.88  The 
two most commonly used methods are private agencies and self-
arrangement.89  Although the government service costs less than private 
recruiters, workers are reluctant to use it because it is considerably slower.90  
A study of Thai workers seeking work in Singapore showed that over 300 
times as many workers used private agencies as used the Ministry of Labour 
program.91  Indeed, in Thailand, private recruiting agencies account for sixty 
to eighty percent of all migrant workers hired.92  Thai workers seeking jobs 
in the United States are especially likely to need to work with private 
recruiters rather than arrange their own employment for two primary 
reasons.  First, the United States is culturally and linguistically dissimilar 
and extremely distant from Thailand.93  Second, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for the workers to navigate the H-2A visa process without 
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 Hall, supra note 27, at 534.  
88
 Diana Wong, The Men Who Built Singapore: Thai Workers in the Construction Industry, in THAI 
MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1996-1997 71 (Supang Chantavanich, Andreas 
Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 2000). 
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 Kusol Soonthorndhada, Changes in the Labor Market and International Migration Since the 
Economic Crisis in Thailand, 10 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL 401, 419 (2001); See Wong, 
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of securing foreign work used by Thais bound for Singapore). 
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 See Ratanakomut, supra note 81, at 131.  The inefficiency of the government recruiting office may 
be in part due to the government’s lack of networks in rural areas.  Soonthorndhada, supra note 89, at 419.   
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workers made their own arrangements and used recruitment agencies for jobs in Singapore.  Id.  Self-
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 Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., As Migrant Ranks Swell, Temporary Guest Workers 
Increasingly Replacing Immigrants: Private Employment Agencies Send Millions Overseas to Work, Apr. 
18, 1997, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/1997/9.htm. 
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 See Soonthorndhada, supra note 89, at 420, table 12 (showing that Thai workers used self-
arrangement far less than private recruiting agencies when going to Israel for work.  Israel, like the United 
States, is far away from Thailand and culturally and linguistically dissimilar.  This is in stark contrast with 
the more frequent use of self-arrangement for jobs in Singapore and Taiwan.).  
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assistance,94 and self-arrangement is more conducive to undocumented 
migration than to formalized visa-based processes.95  
H-2A workers from Thailand are uniquely vulnerable to the abuses 
that pervade the H-2A program.  They have limited opportunities to raise 
concerns because they are linguistically and culturally isolated.  More 
importantly, the weighty recruitment debt burden that they bring to the 
United States disincentivizes them from complaining about their conditions. 
These vulnerabilities make the Thai workers both attractive to employers 
and susceptible to abuse.   
III. SUIT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE 
PROVISIONS IS A VIABLE LITIGATION STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING THAI 
WORKERS FROM RECRUITMENT-FEE DEBT 
In order to ensure adequate working conditions for Thai H-2A 
workers, farm worker advocates must employ a strategy for protecting the 
workers from the recruitment-fee debt burden that essentially deprives them 
of their ability to protect themselves from abuse.  U.S.-based strategies are 
necessary because the Thai government has been unwilling or unable to 
protect workers from exorbitant recruitment fees.  The minimum wage 
provisions of the FLSA may provide this needed relief for the Thai workers.  
In Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, L.L.C.,96 the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a grower was not liable for recruitment fees under the 
FLSA because he was not responsible for the fees under the common law of 
agency.97  Despite the holding in Arriaga, recruitment fees may still be 
attributable to growers under common law agency doctrines.  Two doctrines 
that likely apply in the case of Thai workers are apparent authority agency 
and inherent agency.98  If the fees are attributable to a grower, the FLSA 
requires the grower to reimburse the fees because the fees constitute 
improper de facto wage deductions under § 203(m) of the Act and cause the 
workers’ earnings to fall below minimum wage.99 
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 See generally U.S. Embassy, Mexico, Visa Services: Temporary Worker, 
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/mexico/evisas_work.html [hereinafter Visa Services] (last visited Sept. 19, 
2006) (noting that employers must send documentation to workers before they can even apply for 
individual visas). 
95
 See Soonthorndhada, supra note 89, at 419-21. 
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 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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98
 See infra, Parts III.C.2 and III.C.3. 
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A. U.S.-based Solutions Are Necessary to Protect Thai Farm Workers 
from Recruitment Debt    
U.S. solutions to the problem of recruitment fees are needed because 
the Thai government does not and will not protect workers from extreme 
fees.  A prominent U.S. farm labor contractor has claimed that the Thai 
government will not allow abusive recruitment and employment practices.100  
However, although the Thai Ministry of Labour has imposed limits on 
recruitment fees,101 it rarely enforces these limits.102  The recruitment 
agencies are often run by politicians who use their influence to sidestep the 
regulations.103  Furthermore, widespread corruption within the agencies 
responsible for overseas employment deprives workers of essential domestic 
protections from exorbitant recruitment fees.104 
B. The Minimum Wage Guarantees of the FLSA Could Provide Relief 
from Recruitment Debt for Thai Workers    
Under the FLSA, recruitment fees may constitute impermissible wage 
deductions that violate the Act’s minimum wage guarantees.  The FLSA, 
which unequivocally applies to H-2A workers,105 requires that employers 
pay workers at least the federal minimum wage of $5.15 an hour.106  
Minimum wage is calculated on a weekly basis and must be “free and clear” 
of improper deductions.107   
The FLSA contemplates two types of deductions:  literal and de facto 
deductions.  Literal deductions are wages which are actually subtracted from 
weekly pay.108  De facto deductions are costs of employment that the 
employer cannot actually deduct, but that the employer forces the worker to 
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108
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assume.109  De facto deductions have the same potential to violate the FLSA 
as literal deductions because “there is no legal difference between deducting 
a cost directly from the worker’s wages and shifting a cost, which they could 
not deduct, for the employee to bear.”110   
One example of a de facto deduction would be a special uniform that 
an employer required a worker to purchase prior to the first day on the job.  
If the employer did not reimburse the employee for the cost of the uniform 
during the first week of work, the employer would be, in effect, deducting 
the cost of the uniform from the worker’s wages for that week.111  In the 
same way, when a grower fails to reimburse recruitment fees, these fees may 
constitute de facto deductions under the Act.  A violation of the FLSA would 
occur if the fees, when subtracted from the worker’s total earnings for the 
first week of work, push the worker’s wages below federal minimum 
wage.112  In order to comply with the FLSA, the grower would need to 
reimburse at least a sufficient portion of the fees to ensure that the worker’s 
first week’s wage rose to the federal minimum wage.113 
An example of the weekly calculation formula for wages under the 
FLSA shows how a grower may be required to reimburse a large part of a 
particular Thai worker’s recruitment fees.  First, imagine that a miner is 
required to purchase safety equipment costing $250 before starting work.  
During the first week of work, the miner works forty hours at a pay rate of 
$10 an hour.  The  miner’s weekly wages total $400, which is clearly an 
average of more than $5.15 an hour (the FLSA-mandated federal minimum 
wage).  However, the employer must also treat the $250 expense as a de 
facto deduction, which pushes the total earnings for the first week to $150.  
The average hourly wage is then $3.75 per hour.  The employer does not 
have to pay the entire cost of the safety equipment, but the employer must 
reimburse the miner enough to return the hourly wages at least to the federal 
minimum.  In this case, the employer would owe the miner $56, which 
would raise the total earnings to $206—exactly $5.15 per hour.114  
In the case of a Thai worker who paid $5000 in recruitment fees, the 
result of the minimum wage calculation would be more extreme.  A farm 
worker working forty hours at $9 per hour would earn $360 in the first week.  
The $5000 recruitment expense, however, would drop this wage to $-4640 
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JANUARY 2007 THAI H-2A WORKERS AND THE FLSA 181 
for the week.  The grower would then owe the worker $4846, enough to 
raise the wages to $206 ($5.15 for 40 hours).  The grower would not be 
liable for the entirety of the recruitment fees, but would violate the FLSA 
unless she or he paid the worker at least enough to comply with federal 
minimum wage requirements.115  
C. Recruitment Fees Charged to Thai Workers May Often Be Attributable 
to Growers Under the Common Law of Agency 
The only court to address the question of H-2A recruitment fees and 
the FLSA began with the premise that in order for the growers to be liable 
under the Act for recruitment fees, the fees must be legally attributable to the 
growers under agency law.116  That court did not find that the fees there were 
attributable to the growers.117  Notwithstanding, under a thorough analysis of 
agency law, growers who employ Thai workers may be responsible for the 
fees under the doctrines of apparent authority agency or inherent agency.118   
1. Growers May Be Responsible for Recruitment Fees Under the 
Doctrine of Apparent Authority Agency 
The doctrine of apparent authority agency is outlined in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency (“Restatement”),119 section 27 which 
states:   
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apparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by 
written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal 
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe 
that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by 
the person purporting to act for him.120   
Applied to the present problem, a grower might confer on a recruiter the 
apparent authority to charge recruitment fees by sending a letter to a worker 
saying that the fees were authorized. 
However, the grower does not need to have such direct contact with 
the workers to confer apparent authority.  The common law of agency 
dictates that “other conduct” that may establish apparent authority includes 
putting agents in positions in which they might ordinarily do the things that 
they purport to do. 121  A survey of state agency law as treated by federal 
courts shows the firmly established concept of “apparent authority by 
position” at common law.122  A principal creates apparent authority when the 
principal puts the agent in a position that justifies the third party’s 
assumption that the agent has authorization to perform the act in question, 
regardless of whether the agent is actually authorized.123 
U.S. growers who seek Thai workers generally put recruiters in 
positions that justify workers’ belief that they have authority to charge 
recruitment fees.  It is standard practice for growers to hire U.S.-based farm 
labor contractors to recruit H-2A workers for them,124 but these contractors 
do not complete that task alone.  There are two principal methods by which 
U.S. growers can gain access to workers in Thailand:  through the Thai 
Department of Employment, or through private agencies.125  Due to Thai 
regulations, every U.S. grower who uses a Thai private recruiting agency 
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will necessarily appoint the recruiter as her “recruiting agent.”126  In order to 
use a private agency, the employer must submit, among other things, a 
statement of “power of attorney” which authorizes the Thai recruiter to:  1) 
recruit and select workers, 2) sign all employment contracts on behalf of the 
employer, and 3) apply for visas.127  The relationship between the grower 
and the recruiter is thus a formalized one in which the grower has put the 
recruiter in the position of “recruiting agent.” 
These “recruiting agents” have apparent authority to charge 
recruitment fees to workers.  Once a labor recruiter is appointed to the 
position of “grower’s recruiting agent,” the agent has apparent authority as 
long as the agent behaves in ways that are consistent with the habits of the 
locality, trade, or profession.128  It is ubiquitous practice in rural northern 
Thailand for recruiters to charge recruitment fees to workers who seek 
foreign employment.129  The Bangkok recruiting agencies employ local 
village representatives (called saay) to make initial contact with workers and 
even to help arrange the loans through which the workers pay their 
recruitment fees to the Bangkok agencies.130  Thai workers see fees as an 
integral part of the recruitment process;131 they have no legitimate reason to 
suspect that the recruiters have overstepped their bounds.  
If the recruiters charge fees that the growers have forbidden them to 
charge—even if they commit fraud in charging the fees—the growers may 
still be responsible for their acts under apparent authority agency.  The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a principal may be liable for acts of an 
agent that are expressly contrary to instructions if the third party has a 
reasonable belief that the agent is authorized.132  The Supreme Court, 
extending this liability to cases of fraud, explained in American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. (“ASME”) that a principal is 
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liable for fraud facilitated by an agent’s position when the transaction seems 
to the third party to be within the ordinary duties of the agent.133  Thai 
workers are justified in thinking that the growers’ agents are charging 
authorized recruitment fees, and therefore under the doctrine of apparent 
authority, the growers are responsible for the fees. 
Strong policy considerations justify holding the employers liable even 
for expressly unauthorized or fraudulent acts.  The court in ASME pointed 
out that liability for principals puts pressure on principals to ensure that their 
agents abide by the law.134  Put a different way, growers who are held 
accountable for the fees that their agents charge in Thailand are more likely 
to take steps to insure that the agents they hire are trustworthy and comply 
with instructions.   
In the context of Thai workers who are recruited for jobs in the United 
States, this policy makes especially good sense.  The workers are often on 
the other side of the globe from the growers when they first make 
arrangements with recruiters and enter into their employment contracts.135  
They have few means by which to ascertain the recruiters’ actual scope of 
authority.136  The growers may argue that distance and language barriers also 
make it difficult to for the growers to effectively control the recruiters’ 
activities.  While this may be true, the growers make conscious decisions 
about where to recruit and which recruiters to employ, and they have 
financial leverage with the recruiters.137  The growers are in a much better 
position to insure that the recruiters comply with their wishes than are the 
workers.  Thus, the growers should bear the risk of unauthorized acts by 
their recruiting agents. 
2. The Court’s Reasoning in Arriaga Leaves Substantial Room for Future 
Findings that Recruitment Fees Are Attributable to Growers 
Only one circuit court decision, Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, 
L.L.C., has directly addressed the issue of recruitment fees for H-2A workers 
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and their relation to the FLSA.138  The Arriaga court did not find the 
growers in that case to be responsible for recruitment fees because the court 
concluded that there were no words or conduct in the factual record which, 
interpreted reasonably, could have established apparent authority. 139  
However, the Arriaga court did not expressly address the doctrine of 
apparent authority by position.140   
In Arriaga, the defendant growers hired a farm labor contractor to 
recruit workers for their Florida farms, who then contracted with another 
international recruiter and travel agent.141  The growers instructed the 
recruiters not to charge recruitment fees to the workers, but the international 
recruiting agency did so nonetheless.142  The workers alleged that the fees 
violated the FLSA by pushing their weekly wages below the federal 
minimum wage.143  The Arriaga court did not reach the question of whether 
failure to reimburse recruitment fees could violate the FLSA because it 
determined that the growers in the case were not responsible for the fees 
under the common law of agency.144   
There are two reasons that the Eleventh Circuit’s finding in Arriaga 
does not foreclose the possibility that courts in the future will find growers 
responsible for such fees under the FLSA.  First, agency law questions are 
inherently fact-specific inquiries,145 thus a determination under agency law 
in any particular case is not dispositive of other cases with distinct facts.  
Second, the Arriaga court conducted a limited analysis of agency law.146  
This analysis, which did not expressly address apparent authority by position 
and did not consider other possible routes to agency such as inherent agency, 
                                           
138
 Arriaga, 305 F.3d at  1228.  
139
 Id. at 1245-46. 
140
 See id. at 1244-1246.  Perhaps the court did not address apparent authority by position because the 
parties did not expressly argue it. See generally Brief for Appellants, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 
305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B); Brief for Appellees, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 
F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B).  However, there was some evidence in the record that the 
growers had placed the recruiters in a position that could create apparent authority.  For example, the 
growers hired the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (“FFVA”) to be their labor recruiters, and the 
FFVA shared these duties with Berthina Cervantes, who ran an international recruiting and travel business.  
Arriaga, 305 F.3d  at 1233. 
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 Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1233-1234. 
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 Id. at 1234. 
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 Id. at 1231-1232. 
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n.13 (D.D.C. 1986); Selheimer & Co. v. Murphy, 319 B.R. 395, 407 (Bankr. E.D.P.A. 2005). 
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L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B); Brief for Appellees, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 
L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B). 
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does not set out a comprehensive basis for evaluation of growers’ 
responsibility for recruitment fees.147  
3. Growers May Be Responsible for Recruitment Fees Under the 
Doctrine of Inherent Agency 
Under the doctrine of inherent agency,148 growers may be held 
responsible for recruitment fees even when the “apparent authority by 
position” requirements are not met.  Inherent agency holds a principal liable 
for the acts of her agent when the third party reasonably believes that the 
agent has authority to do what she is doing, regardless of whether the 
                                           
147
 See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1245; See also infra Part III.C.2. 
148
 The most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of Agency proposes to do away with inherent 
agency altogether.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY Introductory Note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).  
There is an active debate in the literature over whether it is prudent to eliminate inherent agency.  See 
generally John Dwight Ingram, Inherent Agency Powers: a Mistaken Concept Which Should Be Discarded, 
29 OKLA.CITY U. L. REV. 583 (2004); Greggory Scott Crespi, The Proposed Abolition of Inherent Agency 
Authority by the Restatement (Third) of Agency: an Incomplete Solution, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337 
(2005); Matthew P. Ward, Note, A Restatement or a Redefinition: Elimination of Inherent Agency in the 
Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585 (2002).  In his Note, 
Matthew Ward argues against the abandonment of inherent agency because it would change the outcome of 
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from current law. Id. at 1604-1605.  Greggory Crespi replies that the Restatement (Third)’s “expansion” of 
apparent authority and its re-worded estoppel sections would cover any cases previously covered by 
inherent agency.  See Crespi, at 359, 362.     
The Thai workers’ situation illustrates that inherent agency should be retained as a distinct concept 
because it encompasses situations not otherwise covered by the Restatement (Third) of Agency.  As a 
beginning point, the Third Restatement includes a definition of “manifestation” which serves as an express 
recognition of the concept of “apparent authority by position.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 
1.03, § 1.03 reporter’s note a (T.D. No. 2, 2001).  This unequivocally covers situations in which a worker 
knows that the grower has put the recruiter in the position of “recruiting agent” on the grower’s behalf.  On 
the other hand, the Third Restatement’s estoppel provision covers situations in which a worker justifiably 
believes (for any reason, not limited to manifestations by the grower) that recruitment fees are authorized, 
and the grower carelessly causes that belief or both 1) has notice of that belief, and 2) fails to take 
reasonable steps to notify the workers of the facts.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (T.D. No. 2, 
2001).  Before the court can hold the grower liable under estoppel, the worker must prove that the grower 
carelessly or unreasonably caused the worker’s change in position in some way.   
The Restatement (Third)’s formulation creates a coverage gap, leaving principals not liable in 
situations in which they would have been liable under the Restatement (Second).  As Mr. Ward correctly 
notes, apparent authority by position does not apply unless the third party knows that the principal has 
officially put the agent in a certain position.  Ward at 1593-1594. However, “if the agent’s conduct alone 
causes the third party’s belief, even if that conduct would make everyone reasonably believe that the agent 
has authority, then no apparent authority exists.”  Ward at 1591.  One can easily imagine a situation in 
which a farmer in rural northeastern Thailand might encounter a recruiter, and having nothing to go on but 
the manifestations of the recruiter himself, reasonably believe that the recruiter is authorized to charge 
recruitment fees.  The grower in this situation would be liable for the fees not by apparent authority, but by 
the current doctrine of inherent agency.  The estoppel inquiries—whether the grower carelessly caused the 
belief or knew of the belief and failed to take reasonable steps to notify the worker—would be irrelevant to 
an inherent agency analysis under the current restatement.  By requiring the worker to prove these estoppel 
elements in order to hold the grower accountable, the Restatement (Third) imposes additional burdens on 
the claimant, and therefore substantively alters the law of agency. 
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principal made any manifestations that authority existed.149  In the case of 
Thai workers and American growers, the inherent agency doctrine would be 
useful specifically when a court has found apparent authority to be lacking 
because the workers were unaware that the grower had officially put the 
recruiter in the position of “recruiting agent.”   
The Restatement section 161 outlines three key requirements for 
principals’ liability based on inherent agency: 1) the agent must be a 
“general agent”; 2) the acts must “usually accompany” or be “incidental to 
transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct”; and 3) the other party 
must reasonably believe that the agent is authorized.150  This rule is based on 
inherent agency powers, which stem solely from the existence of the agency 
relationship itself, and not from actual authority or apparent authority.151  
Under the inherent agency power doctrine, “. . . the principal becomes a 
party to the unauthorized contract made by his general agent even though 
there has been no representation that the agent was authorized.”152  
Thai recruiters who demand recruiting fees from workers fulfill the 
threefold requirements of Restatement section 161.  First, the recruiters are 
“general agents” rather than “special agents” of the growers.  Under the 
restatement definitions, “[a] general agent is an agent authorized to conduct 
a series of transactions involving a continuity of service,”153 while “[a] 
special agent is an agent authorized to conduct a single transaction or a 
series of transactions not involving continuity of service.”154  The 
Restatement recognizes that the difference between the two types of agents 
is “a matter of degree,” and it gives the following factors as guidance for 
making the distinction:  “the number of acts to be performed in 
accomplishing an authorized result, the number of people to be dealt with, 
and the length of time needed to accomplish the result.”155  Growers hire 
farm labor contractors to undertake every aspect of the recruitment and 
hiring process.  This process, especially for a harvesting crew of 100 or more 
workers, includes innumerable contacts and transactions, including initial 
discussions of contract terms, contract signing, visa procurement, and travel 
                                           
149
 Ward, supra note 148, at 1586. 
150
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 (1958). 
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 Id. § 161 cmt. a, Id. at § 8A. ( “Inherent Agency Power is a term used in the restatement of this 
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arrangements156 and can take many months. The farm labor contractors and 
their sub-agents are thus “general agents” of the growers under the 
Restatement definition.   
The case of Cardenas v. Benter Farms157 called upon the district court 
for the Southern District of Indiana to decide if a farm labor recruiter was a 
general agent of his grower.158  The recruiter was employed as a crew chief 
by the defendant, and part of his job was to recruit and hire workers.159  The 
facts showed that he was hired to “transact all the recruiting business of the 
[defendant]” and that the growers did not place any restrictions on the way 
in which he was to recruit workers.160  The court applied the Indiana 
common law definition of “general agent”161 and held that the recruiter was 
a general agent of the growers.162 
When Thai recruiters assess recruitment fees to workers, they also 
fulfill the second and third requirements of the Restatement section 161: 
they are doing something that “usually accompanies” authorized recruiting 
acts, and the workers have no reason to believe that they are not authorized 
to charge the fees.163  In Thailand, it is standard practice for recruiters to 
charge recruitment fees as part of the process of connecting foreign 
employers with Thai workers.164  The workers rely on their knowledge of the 
system and on the statements of the recruiting agents themselves to make 
reasonable judgments that recruiting fees are an ordinary, authorized part of 
the recruitment scheme. 
The policy rationale behind the doctrine of inherent agency applies 
especially well to U.S. growers who recruit in Thailand.  The inherent 
agency doctrine may seem unduly harsh to employers, but the Restatement’s 
drafters argue forcefully that growers, and not workers, should bear the risks 
of the recruitment agency relationship.  A comment to Section 161 explains 
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 See McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 1; Ward, supra note 7; Visa Services, supra note 94;  20 
C.F.R. § 655.102 (b)(5) (2005) . 
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 No. IP 98-1067-C T/G, 2000 WL 1372848 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2000). 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at *9. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at *8.  Indiana common law defines a general agent as “one who is authorized to transact all 
the business of his principal, or all of his business or some particular kind, or as some particular place.”  Id. 
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 Id. at *9.  The Cardenas court, though not using the term “inherent agency power,” upheld the 
doctrine’s rationale:  “if one of two innocent parties must suffer due to a betrayal of trust—either the 
principal or the third party—the loss should fall on the party who is most at fault.  Because the principal 
puts the agent in the position of trust, the principal should bear the loss.” Id. at *9 (citing Koval v. Simon 
Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (Ind. 1998)). 
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 See supra Part II.D 
164
 See supra Part II.D. 
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that agents are essential parts of principals’ businesses.165  Principals reap 
efficiency gains when third parties do not have to rigorously scrutinize the 
extent of the agents’ authority in every seemingly routine transaction.166  Put 
simply, an employer who has benefited from the availability of general 
agents should bear the risk that the agent may do unauthorized things.  This 
risk should not fall on innocent third parties.  Thai workers, especially those 
who come from the rural northeastern corner of the country, have scarce 
means by which to ascertain whether or not the recruiters with whom they 
deal are acting according to the growers’ instructions.  Even if the workers 
knew how to reach the growers by telephone, contact would be exceedingly 
difficult because the workers do not speak English,167 and the fifteen hour 
time difference168 would complicate communications.  The growers, on the 
other hand, prefer Thai workers, and they benefit greatly from sending 
recruiters to find the workers—a task which growers do not have the time or 
the language skills to perform.169  It is the growers, not the Thai workers, 
who should bear the risks of the growers’ recruitment efforts.  
D. The FLSA Requires Growers to Reimburse Recruitment Fees  
Once a court finds a grower to be responsible under agency law for 
recruitment fees, the FLSA requires the court to analyze whether the growers 
must reimburse the workers for the fees.  The fees are impermissible de 
facto wage deductions under the FLSA and must be reimbursed unless they 
satisfy two requirements:  1) they must fall within the exception for “other 
facilities” as defined in section 203(m) of the Act; and 2) they must be “for 
the primary benefit” of the worker, rather than the grower.  The recruitment 
fees paid by Thai workers do not meet either of the requirements, and are 
therefore impermissible deductions.  As a result, the growers must reimburse 
the workers for enough of the fees during their first week of work to ensure 
                                           
165
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 cmt. a (1958).   
166
 Id.  “In the situation in which an agent’s powers exist only because of the rule stated in [section 
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that the workers’ wages meet minimum wage standards.  This result 
effectuates the purpose of the FLSA by protecting workers who have little 
bargaining power.  
1. Recruitment Fees Are Permissible Wage Deductions Only If They Fall 
Within the FLSA’s “Other Facilities” Exception  
The FLSA and its accompanying regulations provide a two-part test to 
determine if wage deductions are allowable.  The Act, in 29 USC § 
203(m),170 allows certain kinds of wage deductions by providing that 
employers can count as “wages”—and therefore legitimately deduct—the 
reasonable cost “of furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging, or other 
facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished 
by such employer to his [or her] employees.”171  In effect, these “customarily 
furnished” items count as “wage credits” for employers, and they are 
allowable even if they cause weekly take-home wages to fall below 
minimum wage.172  The growers in Arriaga argued that recruitment fees 
were “other facilities” within the meaning of the Act, and therefore were 
allowable deductions.173  However, the FLSA’s accompanying regulations 
further clarify that the “the cost of furnishing ‘facilities’ which are primarily 
for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as 
reasonable and may not therefore be included in computing wages.”174  Thus 
de facto deductions for recruitment fees that push weekly wages below 
minimum wage violate the FLSA unless:  1) they are “other facilities” within 
the meaning of the Act, and 2) they are for the “primary benefit and 
convenience” of the workers rather than the grower.   
Courts tend to blend the analysis for these two inquiries, but they are 
conceptually distinct.  The first poses a threshold question:  whether the 
recruitment fees even qualify as “other facilities,” making them eligible to 
count toward workers’ wages.  If the fees are not “other facilities,” the court 
need not look any further—the employer is required to reimburse the fees.  
If the fees are “other facilities,” the second element requires the court to ask 
if the fees are for the primary benefit of the employer, not the worker.  If the 
fees primarily benefit the employer, they are not “reasonable” and therefore 
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 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (Supp. 2006). 
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 Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC , 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir 2002); see also 29 U.S.C § 
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unallowable de facto deductions from wages.  In this scenario, the employer 
is also required to reimburse employees for recruitment fees.  
2. Recruitment Fees Do Not Fall Within the “Other Facilities” 
Deduction Exception  
Recruitment fees should not be considered “other facilities” within the 
meaning of the FLSA.  The phrase “other facilities” is not defined in the 
FLSA, and the Supreme Court has not established a test for determining 
whether an item or expense is “other facilities.”175  However, the two circuit 
courts that have explicitly dealt with the definitional issue are in agreement; 
the phrase “other facilities” must be read in the context of the words “board 
and lodging” in section 203(m).176   
This view is supported by the text of 29 C.F.R. § 531.32, which 
indicates that “other facilities” must be room and board or something 
similar.177  Section 531.32 provides examples of things that are similar to 
board and lodging, including meals furnished at company restaurants, 
housing, general merchandise from company stores, electricity for 
dwellings, and transportation to and from work.178  The court in Arriaga 
recognized that the common thread among the “facilities” on this list is that 
they all “arise in the course of ordinary life.”179  Recruitment fees certainly 
do not meet this standard.  A worker may pay the fees only once a year, 
perhaps even only once in a lifetime.180  The foreign employment 
connections that the fees “purchase” are not quotidian necessities, but 
extraordinary and infrequent expenditures.  The fees, therefore, do not fall 
within the section 203(m) of the FLSA and cannot be deducted from 
worker’s wages. 
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 See De Luna-Guerrero v. North Carolina Growers Association, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 649, 659 
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3. Recruitment Fees Are Impermissible Deductions Because They Are 
“for the Primary Benefit” of the Growers Rather Than the Workers 
Even when the courts do find that expenses fall within the category of 
“other facilities,”181 these items are not always deductible from pay.  Instead, 
they receive only a rebuttable presumption of “reasonableness.”182  Workers 
may rebut this presumption by showing that the fees were “primarily for the 
benefit of the growers.”183  The fact that the regulation contains the word 
“primarily” (rather than “exclusively” or “entirely”) is essential to this 
analysis because it demonstrates recognition that facilities often benefit an 
employee at the same time as they benefit the employer.184  The court then 
must determine which party is the primary beneficiary of the fees. 
Recruitment fees paid by Thai H-2A workers are “primarily for the 
benefit of the growers” under any common-sense reading of the phrase.  
Growers are not allowed to hire H-2A workers until they receive 
certification from the Department of Labor that there are not any local 
workers available to do the work that they require.185  Without the H-2A 
workers, the growers’ crops will rot in the fields.  Their entire harvests, and 
perhaps the very survival of their businesses, may be at stake.  By using the 
H-2A program, the growers get reliable, documented employees.   
The workers also benefit from the farm labor jobs that they obtain by 
paying the recruitment fees, but courts have consistently held that expenses 
are not for the benefit of the worker merely because they enable the worker 
to secure a job in the first place.186  H-2A workers may earn more in the 
United States than they do at home.  They may also sometimes enjoy better 
working conditions at their U.S. jobs.  However, as one court observed, 
“. . . the issue is not whether working in the United States is better than 
working [in their own country] or whether ‘on balance’ working in the 
                                           
181
 By its everyday meaning, the term “facility” connotes “something created to serve a particular 
function,” such as a bathroom or a stadium.  See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY COLLEGE EDITION 
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United States is a ‘good deal’ for the workers.”187  The issue is whether the 
growers are the primary beneficiaries of the fees.  Though the workers 
benefit in some way from the recruitment process (and the fees that facilitate 
it), the workers’ availability preserves the growers’ businesses.  Thus, the 
growers are the primary beneficiaries of the fees.  
Beyond the common meaning of “primary benefit,” the Code of 
Federal Regulations indicates that things which are “for the primary benefit 
of the employer” are things which directly enable employees to do their 
jobs.188  29 C.F.R § 531.32(c) provides courts with examples of things that 
are for the primary benefit of the employer.189  These include:  safety 
equipment, electric power when used for commercial production, company 
guard protection, charges for rental of uniforms when uniforms are required 
by the nature of the business, and transportation that is an incident of and 
necessary to the employment.190  All of the listed items enable workers to 
complete their assigned work. 
Courts have held that long-distance transportation costs are for the 
primary benefit of employers because they are necessary for H-2A workers 
to do their jobs.191  The Arriaga court held that transportation costs for 
workers from Mexico to the United States were for the primary benefit of 
the growers.192  The court pointed out that growers who choose to participate 
in the H-2A program know that workers will not come from commutable 
distances, and that someone will have to pay for their transportations 
costs.193  In that instance, the court had the benefit of a specific reference in 
the regulations to transportation costs.  In the Code of Federal Regulations, 
one example of a cost that is for the primary benefit of the employer is 
“transportation charges where such transportation is an incident of and 
necessary to the employment.”194  The court examined the words “incident” 
and “necessary” in detail, and determined that the transportation costs were 
“an incident of and necessary to” the workers’ employment because they 
were an “inevitable and inescapable consequence of having foreign H-2A 
workers employed in the United States.”195 
                                           
187
 De Jesus De Luna-Guerrero v. North Carolina Growers Association, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 649, 662 
(E.D. N.C. 2005). 
188
 See 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(c) (2005). 
189
 Id. 
190
 Id. 
191
 Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC , 305 F.3d 1228, 1242 (11th Cir 2002); De Jesus De Luna-
Guerrero v. North Carolina Grower's Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661 (D.N.C. 2004). 
192
 Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1242. 
193
 Id.  
194
 29 C.F.R § 531.32 (c) (2005). 
195
 Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1242. 
194 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
 
Though recruitment fees are not specifically mentioned in the 
regulations which accompany the FLSA, the same analysis shows that they 
are also “an incident of and necessary to” the jobs of Thai H-2A workers.  
Growers who choose to employ workers from Thailand will be required by 
Thai authorities to authorize Thai recruiting agents to act on their behalf.  
This relationship is not only required by Thai law,196 but is also necessary as 
a practical matter for U.S. growers, who would otherwise find it impossible 
to make contact with the kind of workers they seek—farmers from rural 
northeastern Thailand.  It is necessary to for H-2A workers to travel long 
distances, thus incurring transportation costs, to arrive and work in the 
United States.  In the same way, it is necessary for employers to use 
recruiting agencies to find Thai workers—and someone must pay the 
recruiters for their efforts.197  The realities of the Thai recruitment system 
make recruitment fees every bit as “inevitable and inescapable” as long-
distance transportation costs.  As a result, under 29 C.F.R 531.32(c), the fees 
“may not be used in computing wages,” including as de facto pre-
employment deductions.198  
4. Growers Must Reimburse Workers for the Recruitment Fees During 
Their First Week of Work 
Under the FLSA, a determination that recruitment fees are 
impermissible de facto deductions from workers’ pay has a clear 
consequence:  the employers must reimburse the workers for the major part 
of the recruitment fees during their first week of work so that the fees do not 
push the workers’ wages below the federal minimum wage.199  The FLSA 
mandates that employers pay workers at least $5.15 per hour,200 calculated 
on a weekly basis.  Workers’ pay must be “free and clear”201 of improper 
deductions, both actual and de facto.202  De facto deductions are costs that 
the employer does not actually deduct from wages, but instead forces the 
worker to incur directly.203  Employers must reimburse employees for 
expenses that they incur during the same week that the expenses arise.204  In 
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the case of pre-employment expenses—such as recruitment fees—the 
employer must reimburse the costs during the workers’ first week of work.205 
E. Holding Recruitment Fees to Be Impermissible Deductions Under the 
FLSA Would Be Consistent with the Purposes of the Act 
A finding that recruitment fees are primarily for the benefit of the 
growers and the resulting requirement that growers reimburse Thai workers’ 
recruitment fees would be consistent with the purposes of the FLSA.  When 
a court is faced with ambiguity in the provisions of the FLSA, the court uses 
the legislative purpose of the act to guide its determination of the correct 
outcome.206  In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil,207 the Supreme Court 
recognized that the primary purpose of the FLSA was to “aid the 
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation’s working 
population; that is, those employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power 
to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.”208  To that end, 
workers cannot waive their statutory right to a minimum wage.209   
Thai workers often find themselves in dismal economic situations, and 
they have very little bargaining power as compared with the U.S. growers 
who employ them.  If courts allow growers to shift their recruitment costs to 
workers without reimbursing them at least to minimum wage levels, the 
effect is to allow the workers to waive their FLSA rights in order to secure 
employment.  If, on the other hand, courts hold growers responsible for the 
fees, then the purpose of the FLSA—the protection of those workers least 
able to protect themselves—is accomplished.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
H-2A workers historically have been vulnerable to abuses by their 
employers.  Thai H-2A workers are particularly disadvantaged because they 
arrive in the United States already saddled with staggering debt from the 
recruitment fees they pay to secure their jobs.  Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Arriaga, the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA can provide 
substantial protection to these workers.  In most cases involving Thai 
workers, recruitment fees will be impermissible de facto wage deductions 
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under the Act.  Suit under the FLSA minimum wage provisions can hold 
agricultural employers liable for their recruitment costs.  As a result, the 
Thai H-2A workers, provided with essential relief from recruitment-fee debt, 
will have increased freedom to protect themselves from abusive conditions 
and employment practices. 
